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Abstract
The historical rise in female labour force participation has attened in
recent decades, but the proportion of mothers working full-time has increased.
We provide the rst empirical evidence that the increase in mothers working
hours is amplied through the inuence of family peers. For identication,
we exploit partially overlapping peer groups. Using Norwegian administrative
data, we nd positive and statistically signicant family peer e¤ects but only
on the intensive margin of womens labour supply. These are in part driven
by concerns about time allocation from early childhood and concerns about
earnings from age 5.
JEL Classication: D85, C21, C26
Keywords: Peer e¤ects, Family network, Sibling spillover e¤ects, Cousins
spillover e¤ects, Instrumental variable estimation
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1 Introduction
Over the last century and in almost all developed countries, female labour
participation has been characterized by a steep increase, which has been driven
mainly by mothers labour participation (Eckstein and Lifshitz 2011 and Fogli
and Veldkamp 2011). Such changes in the mothers labour supply may have
been triggered by the increase in the availability of child care, cultural changes,
the introduction of fertility control methods and other institutional and policy
changes. However, the inuence of peers on individual labour decisions can
amplify the e¤ect of such triggering events and may ultimately be the reason
for the rapid increase in female labour participation over time (see Maurin and
Moschion 2009, Fogli and Veldkamp 2011, Mota et al. 2016).
More recent decades have seen a attening of the trend in mothers labour
participation rates, but a steady increase in the proportion of mothers working
full-time. This is true in Norway (see Fig. 1) and other OECD countries (Blau
and Kahn, 20131), indicating that current changes in female labour supply
is along the intensive margin. In this paper we provide the rst empirical
evidence on the causal inuence of peers on the working hours of mothers in
each of the rst seven years post childbirth. In comparison, previous papers
that have estimated the causal peer e¤ect on mothers labour supply have
focused exclusively on the extensive margin (see Maurin and Moschion 2009,
Mota et al. 2016).2
A mothers work decisions after childbirth may have long term e¤ects on
her human capital, earnings and employment prospects (Edin and Gustavsson
2008) and on her childs outcomes (Ermisch and Francesconi 2005; Bernal 2008;
Liu et al. 2010; Bernal and Keane 2011; Del Boca et al. 2014). There are
two main channels through which mothers labour decisions can be a¤ected by
their peers decisions. One is transmission of information which may be caused
1which shows the large (small) increase in female participation in OECD countries (US)
is accompanied by no change (a fall) in part-time and therefore an increase in full-time work.
2A possible exception is Olivetti et al. (2016), who look at the intensive margin on
womens labour supply and estimate the causal peer e¤ect of a womans school mates
mothers while controlling also for the mothers working hours.
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by the uncertainty of the e¤ect of maternal employment on children, which
leads mothers to look to peers for information (Fogli and Veldkamp 2011). The
other is imitation, where a mothers utility may increase by behaving similarly
to her peers (see Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
We use Norwegian administrative data covering the full population and
identify individuals family relations over multiple generations as well as iden-
tifying where people are living each year. This means that we focus on nat-
urally occurring peer groups from the complete network of family peers and
neighbours. We identify the causal inuence of the family network on long-run
labour supply decisions of mothers post childbirth, in addition to the e¤ect of
neighbours as in existing studies. The mother is more likely to interact mean-
ingfully with her family members than with peers outside the family such as
neighbours, leading to a stronger peer e¤ect on womens labour decisions from
her family. The causal e¤ect of the family network has been studied in some
recent papers that have focused on the spillover e¤ect of siblings on various
outcomes but not on female labour supply.3 Contrary to these papers, we
focus on a wider denition of family network that goes beyond the household
members and includes cousins as well as siblings.
The identication and estimation of the e¤ect of peers has proved to be
challenging because of the issues of reection (simultaneity), correlated omitted
variables and endogenous peer membership (Manski 1993, Mo¢tt 2001). The
empirical strategy to solve the potential reection and endogeneity issues is
based on instrumental variable estimation, exploiting partially overlapping
peer groups (Bramoullé et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2010; De Giorgi et al. 2010).
More precisely we instrument the hours of work for family peers - sisters and
female cousins - with hours worked for recent mothers in their neighbourhood,
relying on the fact that the neighbours of a mothers family peers do not a¤ect
her labour decisions directly but only indirectly through the family peers
labour decisions. Moreover, we measure the e¤ect only for those neighbours
3See Oettinger (2000), Monstad et al. (2011), Adermon (2013), Qureshi (2013), Joensen
and Nielsen (2015), Aparicio-Fenoll and Oppedisano (2016), Dahl et al. (2014), Nicoletti
and Rabe (2016), Altonji et al. (2017).
4
who gave birth before the mothers relatives to solve any reverse causality
issues between family and their neighbours. We can therefore instrument the
average decisions of the family peers with average characteristics of the familys
neighbours. We mainly use the working hours of the familys neighbours as
the instrumental variable. An illustration of the strategy would be a situation
where my sister was weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of working
particular hours and looked to her neighbours. This interaction a¤ected the
labour supply of my sister, and I either took information from my sister about
working hours or I imitated her behaviour.
The endogenous peer membership may occur if the likelihood to interact
with peers depends on unobserved characteristics which also a¤ect the outcome
variable. Relating to our paper, the likelihood to form interactions may depend
on the selection into the neighbourhood only, as individuals cannot select their
family. To control for the potential unobserved common genetic traits and
covariates between the labour supply of the mothers neighbours and of her
family peers neighbours we include as control variable the average worked
hours of the mothers neighbours. This is similar to a neighbourhood xed
e¤ect, excluding the mother.4 In addition, we control for an extensive set
of mother, father and child characteristics as well as for the average of these
characteristics across family peers, which can a¤ect the labour decision of
women after childbirth.
A residual endogeneity bias could remain if there are contextual or envi-
ronmental inuences that a¤ect areas which are larger than a neighbourhood,
potentially including both the mothers and her family peers neighbourhoods.
Examples of these scenarios include i) general equilibrium e¤ects where my
familys neighbour took a job which I would have applied for; ii) the mother
working with her familys neighbour; iii) the mother having grown up with
her familys neighbours. Our results are robust to specications which control
for these potential biases. Lastly, we conduct a set of falsication or placebo
4Controlling for the IV (hours worked) dened at the mothers neighbourhood level
(what we call the individual IV) controls additionally for the exclusion bias, described in
Cayers and Fafchamps (2016) and Section 3.
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tests, by for instance matching mothers with ctitious relatives with similar
characteristics as the actual relatives (see Section 7).
Our sample consists of mothers giving birth in Norway between 1997 and
2002 (see Section 4 for a description of the data) and uses an estimation
approach that takes account of potential biases caused by the omission of
neighbourhood characteristics, the reection problem, and endogeneity and
measurement error issues (see Section 3). We nd that cousins and sisters
have a statistically signicant causal (endogenous) peer e¤ect on the number
of hours worked by mothers of preschool aged children (see Section 5). We
also provide some suggestive empirical evidence of what explains the family
peer e¤ect (see Section 6). We nd that the family peer e¤ects seem driven by
mothers concerns about time investment in the child, while they seem driven
also by concerns about earnings only when the child is 5 and 6 years old.
Finally we provide some evidence of the magnitude the family peer e¤ect
with a back of the envelope computation of the social multiplier e¤ect. Any
change in public policies or events, which lead to an increase in labour supply,
will a¤ect mothers worked hours both directly and indirectly through the
inuence of peers. Based on our results the social multiplier factor is equal to
1.5, which means that, if the direct e¤ect is an increase in the labour supply
by  hours, the total e¤ect will be given by  multiplied by 1.5.
2 Previous literature
Looking at previous papers on peer e¤ects on womens labour supply, there
are only three papers that have attempted to estimate a causal (endogenous)
peer e¤ect on womens labour participation. Maurin and Moschion (2009) and
Mota et al. (2016) focus on neighbourhood rather than family peer e¤ects,
nding evidence of a statistically signicant e¤ect of neighbours labour deci-
sions on womens own decisions. Olivetti et al. (2016) focus on the peer e¤ect
of mothers and of school mates mothers and nd that there are statistically
signicant e¤ects on a womans hours worked from both her mothers hours
and of the average hours across school mates mothers.
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Several studies on peer e¤ects have explored outcomes other than labour
supply, which have looked at peer groups dened as work colleagues (Mas and
Moretti 2009, and Dahl et al. 2014), neighbours (Durlauf 2004) and school
mates (Sacerdote 2011 and Lavy et al. 2012). It is only more recently that
empirical studies have begun to estimate the e¤ect of peers by exploiting the
intransitivity of the network to identify a persons peers of peers, who can
a¤ect her only indirectly through her peers. This approach has borrowed from
the spatial statistics (see Kelejian and Prucha 1998 and Lee 2003) and it is
now been used in several empirical economic studies (see Bramoullé et al.
2009, Chen 2013, Mora and Gil 2013, and Patacchini and Venanzoni 2014).
Generally these studies are based on surveys which collect details of a sample
of individuals and their peers such as the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey
of Adolescent Health (AddHealth), which provides details on school mates
and their peers. Because there are not many of these surveys, some new
empirical studies have begun to rely on administrative data with details on
the population of individuals and peers dened as neighbours, work colleagues
or school mates (see De Giorgi et al. 2010 and 2016 and Nicoletti and Rabe
2016).
3 Identication and estimation of within-family
peer e¤ects
We consider the following mean regression model
yi = α +
_
y
−iρ+ xi β +
_
x−iγ + ǫi, (1)
where the subscript i denotes mothers in our sample and i = 1, ..., n; yi is the
number of weekly hours worked by mother i in a specic year after childbirth;
xi is a row vector with K individual maternal exogenous variables;
_
y
−i =P
j∈PFi
yj
nFi
is the family average of y excluding individual i;
_
x−i =
P
j∈PFi
xj
nFi
are
the corresponding averages of the vector of variables x, PFi is the set of family
peers of mother i excluding herself, i.e. the subsample of mothers who belong
7
to the same family (sisters or cousins); nFi is the number of family peers of
mother i; and εi is an error term with E(εi|x) = 0. The scalar parameter
ρ measures the endogenous family peer e¤ects, γ = [γ1, ...,γK ]
′ is a K × 1
vector of exogenous family e¤ects, β = [β1, ...,βK ]
′ is a K × 1 vector of the
e¤ects of the correspondingK mothers characteristics xi, and nally the scalar
parameter α is the intercept.
To solve the potential reection and endogeneity issues we use an instru-
mental variables approach that can be viewed as an extension of the approach
introduced by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003).5 The extension
consists of considering interactions occurring between people within multiple
rather than a single network.6 We consider the family and neighbourhood
networks, and assume that each mother interacts with her family members
(cousins and sisters) and with her neighbours but that mothers do not in-
teract with her familys neighbours. In practice you may imagine a scenario
where my sister was weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of working
particular hours and looked to her neighbours. This interaction a¤ected the
labour supply of my sister and I either took information from my sister about
working hours or I imitated her behaviour.
Note that we consider homogenous neighbours i.e. neighbours who have
given birth shortly before the sister or cousin and with the same education,
dened as having a degree or not. The approach to consider homogenous peers
has become standard in recent papers on neighbourhood peer e¤ects and it is
justied by the fact that interactions between non-homogenous peers are not
likely.7
We can use the averages of the variables x and the dependent variable y for
the neighbours of the mothers family members as instrumental variables for
_
y
−i. Let
_
xN,−i =
P
j∈PNi
xj
nNi
and
_
yN,−i =
P
j∈PNi
yj
nNi
be the neighbourhood average
of x and y excluding the mother i, where PNi are the sets of neighbour peers of
5See also Lee (2007), Bramoullé et al. (2009), Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), Lee et al.
(2010), and Lin (2010).
6Nicoletti and Rabe (2016) and De Giorgi et al. (2015) also identify peers considering
multiple networks.
7See Mota et al. (2016).
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mother i excluding herself and nNi is the number of neighbour peers of mother
i; then our instrumental variables can be dened as
−
xNF,−i =
P
j∈PFi
_
xN;−j
nFi
and
−
yNF,−i =
P
j∈PFi
_
yN;−;j
nFi
. For our main results we use the instrumental variable
−
yNF,−i, but in our sensitivity analysis we consider also a set of additional
instruments,
−
xNF,−i, which are based on birth outcomes (low birth weight,
very low birth weight, congenital malformation, severe deformity and multiple
births).
We make sure that the instrumental variable
−
yNF,−i is predetermined by
considering the working hours of peers that have given birth in the past.8
As in any other type of application, to be valid our instrumental variables
must be (i) relevant, i.e. they must be important in explaining the average
working hours after childbirth of family peers, our instrumented variable; and
(ii) exogenous, i.e. they must be uncorrelated with unobserved variables ex-
plaining the mothers work status after childbirth. We discuss condition (i)
in Section 5 where we measure the statistical signicance of our instrumental
variable and condition (ii) refers to the issue of correlated unobservables which
we discuss now.
We can assure that our instruments are exogenous if there are no omit-
ted neighbourhood characteristics and if neighbourhood peers of the mothers
family peers do not interact directly with the mother in question. We consider
three potential deviations from these assumptions and our strategies solve for
them.
Firstly our instrumental variables are dened at the neighbourhood level.
If mothers and their family peers tend to sort into similar neighbourhoods,
then failing to control thoroughly for the mothers neighbourhood traits can
lead to an overestimation bias of the family peer e¤ect. For example, I and my
family peers may choose to live in areas with good childcare coverage, making
it easier for us to return to work. Any correlation between our decisions after
8Similarly De Giorgi et al. (2010) and Nicoletti and Rabe (2016) use the average for
the peers of peers of variables which are good predictors of the dependent variable and
observed in the past (e.g. lagged test scores to predict current test scores and self-reported
expectation on future decisions to predict current decisions).
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having children may reect common local childcare provision and not a peer
e¤ect. We are concerned that the hours worked by neighbours of family peers,
−
yNF,−i, can be correlated with the hours worked by the mothers neighbours,
_
yN,−i, and similarly that the neighbourhood average of the covariates for the
family peers,
−
xNF,−i can be correlated with the average covariates across the
mothers neighbours,
_
xN,−i. We avoid this potential bias by controlling for the
average worked hours of the mothers neighbours excluding herself, which we
call individual IVs and average covariates across the mothers neighbours.
This means that we include among the explanatory variables in equation (1)
_
yN,−i (
_
xN,−i) whenever we use as instrumental variable
−
yNF,−i (
−
xNF,−i).
yi = α +
_
y
−iρ+ xi β +
_
x−iγ +
_
yN,−iδ + ǫi, (2)
Controlling for the individual IVs corrects not only for the bias caused by
unobserved characteristics of neighbours but also for the exclusion bias (see
Guryan et al. 2009, Caeyers and Fafchamps 2016). We estimate equation
(2) using a two-stage least squares estimation. Because we control for the
individual IV,
_
yN,−i in both rst and second stages, the estimated e¤ect of the
instrument
−
yNF,−i is net of the e¤ect of neighbours of family members living
in the same neighbourhood as the mother in question.
Secondly, we worry about potential interactions between a mother and the
neighbours of her family peers. If such interactions exist then the family peers
neighbours could have a direct e¤ect on the mother and therefore the average
characteristics of the neighbours of her family peers,
−
xNF,−i and
−
yNF,−i, would
be invalid instruments. As mentioned above, equation (2) controls for any
interactions between mothers living in the same neighbourhood as her family.
However, even for mothers living in di¤erent neighbourhoods as her family, our
instruments could be invalid if there are unobserved factors explaining labour
market decisions of both the peers of peers and the mother in question. Ex-
amples of these scenarios include general equilibrium e¤ects where my familys
neighbour took a job which I would have applied for, if I work with or grew
up with my familys neighbour or if there are direct interactions between a
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mother and her family peers neighbours. We consider potential threats to the
validity of our instruments and perform sensitivity analyses to show that our
estimation results are not a¤ected by such threats. Finally, we use multiple
instruments and test the over-identifying restrictions to assess the validity of
our instruments (see Section 7).
Thirdly, labour supply decisions of family peers may a¤ect the correspond-
ing decisions of their neighbours because of the so called feedback or reverse
causality e¤ect. This implies that our instruments, which are average char-
acteristics of the family peers neighbours, may be correlated with the error
term in our main equation. We avoid this potential bias by considering only
neighbours that had their rst child between one and ve years earlier than
the family living in the same neighbourhood.
To support that there is no residual endogeneity bias, we also consider the
estimation of the family peer e¤ect using sister and cousin - in laws who have
no genetic link to the mother and we consider some placebo tests in Section
7. In particular, we consider the estimation of the family peer e¤ect when
replacing the family members with randomly chosen family peers with similar
characteristics of the mother (placebo test 1), with the same date of birth
of the mother (placebo test 2) and with cousins who give birth in the future
(placebo test 3).
A remaining threat to our strategy which we cannot test, is where a
mothers behaviour is a¤ected by her familys neighbours, but the familys
behaviour is not. An illustration of this threat would be situation where I
just had a baby and my cousin tells me that her neighbour was very happy
to go back to work soon after giving birth and I got inuenced by this bit of
information and decided to go back to work early, even if my cousin was not
inuenced by her neighbour experience and did not go back to work early. In
this situation there is a potential direct e¤ect from my cousins neighbour to
me. However, we think the likelihood of a mother changing her behaviour in
response to information which her sister or cousins did not react to is small.
Finally, the estimation of the family peer e¤ect on hours worked is prone to
attenuation bias caused by measurement error in the variable used to construct
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labour hours. Our instrumental variable estimation corrects for such bias
under the assumption that the labour hours of the family peers and of their
neighbours have uncorrelated measurement errors, which is credible.9
4 Data
4.1 Data and sample selection
We use Norwegian administrative register data for the period 1960-2010,
which are collected and maintained by Statistics Norway. The data provides
unique linkage of the population of Norway across di¤erent registers and across
time, providing information to enable identication of family members and
neighbours living in the same zip code and information on labour market
status, the month and year of birth, birth outcomes, earnings and demographic
variables including age and education.
For all births since 1960 we extract identiers of the newborns mother
from census data. We then link on the sisters and cousins of this childs
mother by the following method. To link the mothers with her sisters we
dene her mothers identier (the maternal grandmother of the child). Moth-
ers to children with a common maternal grandmother are siblings. In order
to link the mother to her female cousins, we take her maternal and paternal
grandmothers identiers and consider all mothers with either a shared ma-
ternal or paternal grandmother (the two maternal great-grandmothers of the
child). Any mothers to children with a common maternal great-grandmother
are dened as cousins. This creates a set of maternal cousins (whose childs
maternal grandmother has the same mother) and a set of paternal cousins
(whose childs maternal grandfather has the same mother). We can identify
the cousins as long as their grandmothers are alive in the rst census year in
1960. Assuming an average gap of 30 years between generations and consid-
ering children born in 1997, their two maternal great-grandmothers would be
born in 1907 and be 53 years old in 1960. This suggests that children born
9See Appendix A for full details.
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from 1997 onward are likely to have their two maternal great-grandmothers
alive in 1960. Our main sample is selected from all births between 1997 and
2002. We cut o¤ births before 1997 because we want to minimize the number
of cases of children with maternal great-grandmothers who are not identiable
because they are not alive in 1960. Births after 2002 are not considered as we
need to observe the labour supply of mothers up to 7 years after the childbirth
year and information on labour supply are currently available up to 2010. So
that future decisions of family cannot a¤ect contemporaneous decisions of the
mother, the family peer group of a mother when she gives birth is constructed
as all cousins who have given birth in the past, which is dened as at least one
month prior to the mother.
We construct a measure of weekly hours worked by the mother from the
labour market register, which started in 1986. Hours is recorded as a discrete
variable taking the values of 0, 1-19, 20-29 and 30+. We create a variable for
hours by taking the mid-point of these categories, thereby recording hours as
0, 10, 24.5 and 40 as the nal category which represents a full-time contract
in Norway.
The neighbourhood peer group is constructed by linking each mother to
all other mothers living in her zip code and we select only those neighbours
giving birth between one and ve years earlier than the mother. Restricting
the neighbours and family peers to women who gave birth in the past, we avoid
the fertility contagion or peer e¤ects from neighbours and family members (see
Kuziemko 2006). Furthermore, to consider a more homogeneous denition of
neighbourhood, we consider mothers who live in the same zip code and with
the same level of education, dened by an indicator for having a degree. Our
assumption here is that neighbours are much more likely to interact with other
neighbours with the same level of education.
Next we take from the administrative register variables which control for
the timing of the mothers birth. We also consider the level of education of the
mothers10 and a quadratic in the age at birth which together proxy for years
10We treat this variable as predetermined, as only 8% of mothers increase their education
during the sample period.
13
of experience in the labour market. Additionally we construct an indicator
for working before childbirth which takes the value 1 if mothers worked in the
year prior to childbirth and 0 otherwise.11
We drop from our sample families where the mothers siblings have di¤erent
fathers. We select rst births to each mother because the decision to work
after having a child di¤ers across the birth order of o¤spring. We therefore
compare like-with-like when comparing the decision of the mother with that
of her peers. The sample of births occurring between 1997 and 2002 consists
of 45,985 rst births to mothers with at least one sister or female cousin.
Table 1 shows that the family peer group consists of on average 3.074
maternal cousins, 3.149 paternal cousins and 0.614 sisters. The second peer
group - homogenous neighbours - is larger, with on average 26.924 neighbours
living in the same zip code. To give a little information on the size of a zip
code, there are on average 3,100 individuals and 1,400 households within this
neighbourhood, but the relevant group of neighbours (which is dened as the
group of mothers living the same zip code, giving birth to their rst child
between 1 and 5 year earlier than the mother in question and with the same
level of education) is evidently smaller. It is not very common for a mother to
live in the same zip code as her family peers (1% of mothers) but much more
likely to live in the same municipality (23%).
Looking at the labour participation of mothers in the year after childbirth
we nd that on average mothers work 18.6 hours a week with a variation within
family which is only 12% of the total variance. This compares to variation
within neighbours which is 90% of the total variance. The average number of
hours worked by new mothers increases steadily from 18.6 in the year after
childbirth to 23.5 hours 7 years after childbirth. On average 77.6% of mothers
work in the year prior to childbirth, mothers have on average 13.3 years of
schooling. Nearly all fathers (97.7%) work in the birth year of their rst child
and the age of mothers and fathers at the rst births is on average 25.8 and
11To assure that our results are not confounded by later fertility decisions, we interact
the family peer e¤ect with a dummy for not having another child within the sample window
and with the exception of one year, nd no signicant interaction.
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29.3 years respectively. We control for the month of birth and a set of controls
relating to birth outcomes of the child, including an indicator for twins, low
birth weight, congenital malformation and severe deformity which may drive
the labour supply of a mother. These birth indicators are relatively rare events,
with 4.8% and 0.6% of newborns having a low or very low birth weight child
respectively, 4.1% and 2.5% of newborns having congenital disorders and severe
deformity respectively and 1.8% of births being non-singletons, but they are
potential determinants of maternal labour supply so important controls for
labour market participation of new mothers.
All our estimations control for the list of variables reported in Table 1 as
well as for a set of dummies for the year and month of birth. We include these
dummies to control for the potential bias caused by the measurement error
on the working hours (see Section 8 for details) as well as to take account of
potential institutional and policy changes.
5 Estimation results
In Table 2 we report the results for the linear in mean model (see equa-
tions (1) and (2)). We report the estimated family (sisters and cousins) peer
e¤ect on mothers weekly hours worked in each of the 7 years after the rst
childbirth, with each column representing the estimated family peer e¤ect in
a di¤erent post childbirth year. By row, we report three di¤erent estimates
of the family peer e¤ect: the OLS (ordinary least squares), the 2SLS (two-
stage least squares) and the 2SLS with control for the IV at individual level
(2SLS Individual IV).12 We use the same instrumental variable across the 7
columns, which is the average across the neighbours of mothers family peers
of the working hours one year after childbirth. More precisely, we take for
each cousin (sister) the mean of this variable dened across the set of her
homogenous neighbours (i.e. neighbours living in the same postal code area,
giving birth between 1 and 5 years prior to the family member and with the
12The OLS and 2SLS estiamtions are applied to model (1); whereas the 2SLS Individual
IV is applied to model (2).
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same level of education) and then we average these means across the mothers
sisters and cousins who gave birth before the mother. The corresponding IV
at individual level is dened by taking the average of the worked hours one
year after childbirth across the mothers neighbours who gave birth between 1
and 5 years earlier than the mother. In all regressions we control for the corre-
lated e¤ects by including individual characteristics that are likely to be similar
between family members and relevant in explaining mothers labour supply.
In particular we consider the mothers years of education in level and squared,
an indicator for working in the year prior to childbirth, fathers earnings and
work status in the year of childbirth, fathers and mothers age at the birth
of the child and their squares, child health conditions at birth (dummies for
low birth weight, for very low birth weight, for congenital malformations and
severe deformity) and an indicator for multiple births. We control for potential
cohort and seasonality e¤ects by including 9 birth cohort year dummies and
dummies for the month of birth. We control additionally for the contextual
peer e¤ect by including family peer means of the same set of covariates. We
allow for correlation in the error terms within municipalities in all regressions
and correct the standard errors to take account of this.
The OLS estimates of the family peer e¤ect are very similar across post
birth years and suggest that a one hour increase in the mean family peers
hours supplied to the labour market is associated with an increase in moth-
ers labour supply by about half an hour. However this is not a causal peer
e¤ect for two reasons. Firstly, there is a potential upward bias caused by the
reection problem and other potential endogeneity issues caused by omission
of variables which could explain both the mothers and her family peers hours
worked. Secondly the coe¢cient is prone to attenuation bias from measure-
ment error (see Section Appendix A1 for details) and a negative bias caused
by the exclusion of the mother from her family group peers (see Caeyers and
Fafchamps 2016).
To correct for the biases caused by endogeneity issues and measurement
error inherent in OLS estimation, we report 2SLS estimation results. The
2SLS estimate of the family peer e¤ect increases for all post birth years and
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seems to suggest that the OLS estimation is a¤ected by an attenuation bias
caused by measurement error, which is larger than the overestimation bias
caused by the reection problem and other potential endogeneity issues. The
2SLS estimation is still potentially biased because of the exclusion issue and of
the potential sorting of family peers into similar neighbourhoods. Caeyers and
Fafchamps (2016) show that the exclusion bias is negative and converges to
zero when the sample size tends to innity if the peer group size remains small.
Because in our sample the largest family group has size 32 while the sample size
is 45,985, we expect a very small and negligible exclusion bias. On the contrary,
we expect the omission of neighbourhood characteristics which are similar
between the mother and her family peers to lead to an over-estimation bias,
which can be substantial if mothers neighbours and family peers neighbours
have very similar worked hours. Controlling for the average worked hours of
the mothers neighbours, i.e. the individual IV, allows us to eliminate both the
biases (see the 2SLS individual IV in Table 2). Because the estimated family
peer e¤ects reduce considerably, we infer that the over-esitmation bias caused
by the sorting of family peers into similar neighbourhoods is much larger than
the potential negative exclusion bias.
We nd no statistically signicant peer e¤ect in the year after birth, but
strong and signicant peer e¤ects for the following years ranging between 0.30-
0.45. The e¤ect is strongest at 2 years after childbirth, whereafter statistical
signicance along with magnitude declines across the years. This implies that
an increase in mean working hours of the mothers family peers by 1 hour leads
the mother to raise her hours by 18-27 minutes. The exception is the family
peer e¤ect at 7 years after childbirth which is not statistically signicantly
di¤erent to zero. Nevertheless, because the family peer e¤ects are not very
precisely estimated, we cannot conclude that there is a systematic di¤erence
of the peer e¤ect on mothers labour supply 7 years after childbirth.
We compute Hausman tests to check the assumption of equality between
the coe¢cients estimated using the 2SLS individual IV estimation and OLS
estimation controlling for the individual IV, and we do not reject the equality
assumption at standard levels of signicance (see p-values in Table 2). If we
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assume that the exclusion bias be insignicant because of our large sample size,
then di¤erences between the two estimations are caused by the fact that the
OLS estimation is biased by measurement error and endogeneity issues (in par-
ticular by the reection and omitted variables issues). Therefore the Hausman
test results suggest that the attenuation bias caused by measurement error is
of equal magnitude but opposite sign compared with endogeneity biases. The
F-tests for the signicance of the instrument reported at the bottom of Table
2 suggest that our instrumental variable is strong and statistically signicant.
We apply the 2SLS Individual IV estimation for all our further regression
analysis because the measurement error and endogeneity biases do not neces-
sarily always cancel each other. We consider the 2SLS Individual IV estimation
results reported in Table 2 as our preferred results and the benchmark against
which we compare any further estimation. The full regression results for the
2SLS Individual IV estimation are reported in Appendix Table A1 (split in
two parts, A1a and A1b) for the second stage estimation and in Appendix
Table A2 for the rst stage estimation.
To summarize, an hour increase in the mean labour market participation
of mothers family peers is associated with an increase in hours worked by
the mother of between 18-27 minutes once we control for measurement error,
unobserved neighbourhood characteristics, the reection issue and a potential
exclusion bias.
6 What explains the family peer e¤ect
In this section we assess the importance of di¤erent channels which drive
the family peer e¤ect on mothers labour decisions. In Section 6.1 we examine
whether the family peer e¤ect on mothers worked hours is driven mainly by a
peer e¤ect on mothers earnings power. In Section 6.2 we compare the family
peer e¤ect at intensive and extensive margins. For this, we assess whether
the e¤ect of the family peers on the mothers labour market decisions come
mostly through her participation decisions rather than through her decision
about how many hours to work. In Section 6.3 we estimate the neighbourhood
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peer e¤ect in order to compare our estimates to the literature on the inuence
of peers on mothers labour supply decisions. In Section 6.4 we give some
magnitude to the family peer e¤ect by calculating the social multiplier e¤ect.
6.1 Time and money investments
When a mother with young children makes a decision about whether to
work or stay at home, she faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand increasing hours
worked may be a concern for a mother because of the potential constraints
imposed on the time a mother can spend with their child. On the other hand,
reducing hours worked can also be a concern because of the related reduction in
earnings and increased constraints imposed on family consumption and mone-
tary investments in the child.13 The literature has found that time investments
of parents are highest in early childhood and falling across age (Del Boca et
al. 2012, Guryan et al. 2008, Zick and Bryant 1996) whilst nancial invest-
ments tend to increase as children age (Kornrich and Furstenberg 2013 show
that expenditure in child education is at between years 0-2 but increasing
thereafter). For this reason mothers may be inuenced by their family peers
through time spent with their child and through increased earnings and this
inuence may vary across child age.
We explore these two channels by analysing how the mothers hours worked
respond to the mean earnings of her family peers. In Table 3 we report the
e¤ect of the average earnings across family peers on mothers hours worked,
estimated using a 2SLS with individual IV. We nd that this earnings e¤ect
is not statistically di¤erent from zero in the rst three years after childbirth,
while it becomes signicant in the fourth, fth and sixth year after childbirth.
To give some idea of magnitude, family earnings, deated to 2000, have been
standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The
results show that a standard deviation increase in the familys earnings four
years after birth (which equates to approximately 18,000 Norwegian Krone or
2000 US dollars) leads the mother to increase her hours worked by 3.6 hours.
13Models of parents making investment decisions which drive child human capital include
Bernal (2008), Cunha and Heckman (2007), Cunha et al. (2010) and Carneiro et al. (2015b).
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Five years and six years after birth a standard deviation change in the family
peers earnings raises the mothers hours by 2.9 and 2.3 hours respectively.
The lack of statistically signicant peer e¤ect in earnings in the early years
suggest that women with very young children are not concerned with the nan-
cial investments of their family peers but with time investments of mothers in
their children. On the contrary, once the child is in its fourth year, the earning
consequences become relevant for mothers and they begin to be inuenced by
the earnings of their peers. This nding is in line with the literature which
suggests that time investments are more important for very young children
and nancial investments begin to matter more later in life.
6.2 Intensive and extensive margins
We show in Fig. (1) that in recent years, a substantial shift in female labour
supply has come through a change in hours worked. We aim now to provide
evidence that the family peer group inuences the mothers decisions through
the intensive margin, rather than through a participation decision. In Table 4
we analyse how important peers are in the decision to return to work versus
stay at home. We report the results of the 2SLS Individual IV estimation of
the linear probability model for mothers labour participation using the same
explanatory variables and instruments as in our main estimation. While in
Table 2 we nd that an increase in the mothers family peers average hours
worked leads to an increase in the mothers worked hours, in Table 4 we nd no
statistically signicant e¤ect on the mothers labour participation. Therefore
we conclude that the relevant e¤ect of family peers is at the intensive, rather
than the extensive margin of mothers labour supply.14
14We also regressed the family peers participation on the mothers labour participation.
With the exception of two years after childbirth, there was no signicant family peer e¤ect
of participation. Note that between 3-7 years after birth the F-statistic falls to below 10
which again suggests that peers do not inuence the participation decision of mothers in
this period.
20
6.3 Neighbourhood peer e¤ect
There are no studies that have estimated the causal e¤ects of family peers
on mothers labour supply15 but, as noted in the introduction, there are two
papers that have focused on causal neighbourhood e¤ects on womens labour
participation, which are Maurin and Moschion (2009) and Mota et al. (2016).
To compare to these papers, we now adapt our identication strategy to
estimate the neighbourhood peer e¤ect on the mothers working hours. We
still estimate equation (2), but we exchange the roles of the neighbours and
family peers and consider an instrumental variable estimation. The instrument
therefore is the average hours worked of the (homogenous) neighbours family
peers.16 Again we control for the individual IV, which in this case is the mean
hours worked by the mothers family, excluding the mother (2SLS Individual
IV).
Results are presented in Table 5 where we report the 2SLS Individual IV.
For one hour increase in the average worked hours of the mothers neighbours,
the mother increases her hours by between 2 and 17 minutes. Nevertheless, the
peer e¤ect is statistically signicant at 5% level only between 3-5 years after
childbirth. The instrument is highly signicant (see F-tests 1st stage reported
in Table 5), which suggests that the absence of a signicant neighbourhood
e¤ect for some of the years is not caused by a weak instrument. This seems
to suggest the family peers have a stronger e¤ect than neighbourhood peers.
Maurin and Moschion (2009) nd that a 10 percentage point increase in
the percentage of close neighbours participating in the labour market raises
individual participation by 6 percentage points. The magnitude of this neigh-
bour e¤ect seems larger than our neighbourhood peer e¤ect and more similar
in magnitude to our family peer e¤ects estimated using 2SLS Individual IV.
15There are some studies who look at the association in labour participation decisions
across family peers, but their results do not have a causal interpretation (see Neumark and
Postlewaite, 1998, for the e¤ect of sister-in-laws employment on a womans own employment
probability; Del Boca et al., 2000, for the e¤ects of work status of the mother-in-law and
of the mother on a womans own employment; and Fernandez et al., 2004, for the e¤ect of
having a mother-in-law who works on the probability of own (female) work).
16Neighbourhood peers are dened as those giving birth between 1-5 years before the
mother, with the same level education.
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In their most robust estimation Mota et al. (2016) nd that one additional
working homogeneous neighbour increases the probability of a woman work-
ing by about 4.5 percentage points, one additional non-working homogenous
neighbours decreases her probability by about 9 percentage points, whereas
the labour participation of non-homogenous neighbours do not have any sig-
nicant e¤ect. These e¤ects seem smaller than in Maurin and Moschion (2009)
and perhaps more in line with our estimates.
6.4 How important is the family peer e¤ect
Whether the labour supply decisions of a mother a¤ect those of her family
members is interesting from a policy perspective, because the direct e¤ect of
any policy aiming at raising labour hours of mothers, such as the US Family
and Medical Leave Act, is likely to be amplied through the indirect e¤ect of
peers inuence. We now provide a calculation of the multiplier e¤ect using the
results in Table 2. If the family peer e¤ect is a source of social interaction, we
expect to nd a multiplier greater than one. Imagine a policy which leads to
a one weekly hour increase for the targeted mother. Through the family peer
e¤ect, the policy would increase also hours worked by her sisters and cousins.
We calculate the multiplier e¤ect as 1
1−
^
ρ
, where
^
ρ is an estimate of ρ dened
in equation 2 and take the mean multiplier across the seven estimates. The
mean multiplier e¤ect is 1.5, which means that if the direct e¤ect of the policy
is to increase hours worked in a week by 1, the total e¤ect including the social
multiplier is 1.5 hours.
The dramatic rise in female labour force participation which took place
from the 1960s onwards has been explained in the literature by factors in-
cluding the expansion of female education (Ekstein and Lifshitz 2011) and a
reduction in the cost of children (Attanasio et al. 2008, Ekstein and Lifshitz
2011). Any triggering events which raise female labour supply will have an
amplied e¤ect through the family peer e¤ect. We extend our calculation of
the multiplier e¤ect to examine how a policy to raise the compulsory schooling
level of education from 10 years to 11 (or from age 16 to 17) raises the hours
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worked by women. Note that we use this example as an illustration of how
the social multiplier works to spread the e¤ect of a policy targeting mothers
labour supply. The true social multiplier e¤ect would be applied to a causal
estimate of education on mothers hours worked. In our model, mothers hours
worked are a¤ected by her own education (Table A1a) and that of her fam-
ily peers (Table A1b) although as only the former are generally statistically
signicant we focus on these coe¢cients to estimate the total e¤ect on hours
worked from the policy change. The direct e¤ect of an increase in mothers
education by 1 year, assuming she had the compulsory 10 years of schooling is
to raise her hours by 1.5 hours.17 Adding in the multiplier through the family
peer e¤ect (multiplying the direct e¤ect of education by the mean multiplier
of 1.5), the total e¤ect of the education expansion policy is to raise hours by
between 1.8 hours, which is 48% of the direct e¤ect.
Another metric of the importance of the family peer e¤ect in explaining
labour supply decisions of the mother, is the proportion of the variation in
hours explained by the family peer e¤ect, at each of the 1-7 years after birth.
The family peer e¤ect two years after birth explains 14.7% of the variation in
hours after two years and this proportion falls steadily across the years so that
11.9%, 10.9%, 7%, 9% and 4.2% of the variation in hours 3-7 years after birth
is explained by the family peer e¤ect respectively.18
In summary, the family peer e¤ect is an important source of social interac-
tion for the hours worked by new mothers. With a multiplier e¤ect larger than
one, the family peer e¤ect magnies the e¤ect of a policy targeting labour
market hours of new mothers or raising the years of compulsory schooling. It
explains a large proportion of the variation in hours worked, especially between
2 and 4 years after birth.
17This is calculated for each year after birth as the sum of the coe¢cient on mother
education and the coe¢cient on mother education squared multiplied by 20. Then we
calculate the mean.
18This was calculated as the ratio between the variance of the average worked hours
multiplied by ρ2 and the variance in the dependent variable.
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7 Robustness and placebo checks
In our main specication we have used the neighbours hours worked in
the year after childbirth, averaged across family peers as an instrument. The
instrument is valid if the mother does not interact with her sister or cousins
neighbours. We are unable to directly test this assumption but we provide
evidence on the validity of the instrument by including additional instruments
and reporting the p-value for the Hansen overidentication test. The 2SLS
individual IV estimation results are reported in the panel a) of Table 6. The IVs
are the average across the mothers family peers of their neighbourhood average
of hours worked, dummy variables for low birth weight, very low birth weight,
congenital malformation, severe deformity, and multiple birth. The p-value
for the Hansen test is above or equal 0.32, suggesting that our instruments
are valid. Note that the F-statistics for the rst stage signicance of the
instruments are lower once we combine multiple instruments compared to using
just one instrument and therefore the results of Table 6 are less precisely
estimated than in Table 2. However, the magnitude of the estimated family
peer e¤ect is in line with Table 2.
In the following we provide further empirical evidence on the validity of
our estimation method by considering some robustness and placebo checks.
We start by considering two potential threats to our identication strategy.
Firstly, mothers labour supply decisions might a¤ect labour market outcomes
of their family members and their neighbours through general equilibrium
e¤ects in the labour market. For example, when a mother (neighbour) gets
a job this might be at the expenses of others, including their excluded peers.
Secondly, the mother may work with her familys neighbours, existing in the
same work peer group. We control for these threats by including a set of
dummy variables for the mother occupation interacted with dummies for the
mothers level of education (see Table 6 panel b). After adding these new
dummy variables the peer e¤ects are less precisely estimated, but we still nd
evidence supporting the presence of a positive family peer e¤ect on mothers
worked hours after childbirth in all years but statistically signicant only in
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the second and third year after childbirth.
Next, we consider an additional violation of our identication strategy
which is that the mother may have grown up with her family members neigh-
bours. Imagine a situation where the mother moved away from her childhood
neighbourhood but her sister did not. Then there may be a direct e¤ect of
the familys neighbours on the mother. In panel c) of Table 6, we include an
additional control which is the average hours worked one year after birth at
the municipality level where we exclude the mother, similar to controlling for
a municipality xed e¤ect. In Norway there are approximately 450 munici-
palities of a much larger geographical area then neighbourhoods. We think
that the mother is more likely to meaningfully interact with the neighbours
she grew up with if they live currently in the same municipality. Also to the
extent that mothers live in the same municipality when they have their child
as when growing up, our estimates will be net of the e¤ect of early life neigh-
bours on the mothers labour supply decisions after birth. The estimates are
less precise and slightly lower magnitude to our preferred specication but not
statistically di¤erent.19
Our instrument is constructed at the level of the neighbourhood and there
may be unobserved heterogeneity through similarities in characteristics of the
mothers and of her familys neighbours. To test for this, we run two placebo
tests. Firstly we randomly assign to each mother a ctitious set of relatives
with similar characteristics as the true relatives (placebo test 1 in panel d).
We divide the sample of mothers into cells, or subgroups, dened by level of
the familys education (below and above the average of 12 years), age at birth
(below and above the mean age at birth) and employment status before giving
birth (working and non-working one year before the rst childbirth). Each
family peer of a mother is replaced with the family peer of a woman randomly
selected from the subgroup of mothers within the same cell. We then apply the
2SLS estimation with individual IV to produce an estimate of the family peer
19Note that a potential worry is the presence of a macroeconomic shock which is common
to mothers living in di¤erent neighbourhoods but the same wider area of a municipality.
However, in our main estimation we control for time varying shocks to the neighbourhood
and therefore also for any common shock to the wider geographical area.
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e¤ect using the observed average worked hours for these ctitious relatives
and instrumenting it using the neighbours of these ctitious relatives. We
repeat this random allocation of relatives to mothers re-shu­ing the mothers
within cells 1000 times and producing 1000 estimates of the family peer e¤ects.
Table 6 (see panel c, placebo 1) reports the percentage of cases out of the 1000
replications in which the family peer e¤ect is found to be statistically signicant
at the 5% level. For each of the 7 years after childbirth, the family peer e¤ect
is statistically signicant in less than 5% of replications when using ctitious
relatives. Therefore, we conclude that the signicant family peer e¤ect found
in the paper is not spuriously explained by similarities in the family peers
characteristics.
It may be that the family peer e¤ect we estimate is purely picking up a
year e¤ect or time trends in hours worked. Similarly to the implementation of
the rst placebo test we divide the sample of mothers into cells by the year of
birth of their child and we randomly reassigned ctitious relatives to mothers
by randomly choosing women form the subgroups of mothers with the same
year of birth of their child. Again, we use these ctitious relative to estimate
the family peer e¤ect using 2SLS estimation with individual IV and repeating
this random assignment of family peers within cells 1000 times. As above in
over 95% of cases the estimated peer e¤ect using ctitious family peers is not
di¤erent to zero at 5% level of signicance and we conclude that our estimation
results are not driven by year or time trends e¤ects (see placebo 2 in panel e)
Table 6).20
We perform also a third placebo test where the family peers of a mother are
dened considering sisters and female cousins who will have a child later rather
than earlier than the mother. We take sisters and cousins who give birth in
the future, and estimate the e¤ect of the average hours worked by these family
peers between 1-7 years after childbirth. This should break the causal link and
give null e¤ects if there is no inuence from family peers who have not yet had
a child. As instruments we still use the average of hours worked for the family
20The percentage of repetitions for which the F-statistic in the rst stage is greater than
10 is 100% in all cases, for the two placebo tests.
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peers neighbours who gave birth to their rst child between 1 and 5 years
earlier. The results seem a little erratic but suggest that there is no clear
statistically signicant positive family peer e¤ect on mothers hours worked
(see placebo 3 panel f) Table 6).
We check whether the family peer e¤ect is driven by (i) sisters rather
than cousins and (ii) by unobserved shared genetic and family background
characteristics. By estimating the peer e¤ect separately for sisters and female
cousins, we nd a positive and signicant peer e¤ects for using both denitions
of the family peer group (panels a and b in Appendix Table A3 respectively).
By considering the peer e¤ect of the mothers sisters-in-law and female cousins-
in-law, who are not genetically related and who do not share any grand-parent
with the mother, we nd that the peer e¤ects are still positive and signicantly
di¤erent from zero (see panel c of Appendix Table A3).
In recent years in Norway there have been several reforms with potential
consequences for female labour supply: parental leave reforms which expanded
the amount of leave taken by mothers and introduced a paternity leave (Cools
et al. 2015, Dahl et al. 2013, Carneiro et al. 2015a); the lowering of school
starting age from 7 to 6 (Finseraas et al. 2015) and universal preschool child
care reforms (Havnes and Mogstad 2011a, Havnes and Mogstad 2011b, An-
dresen and Havnes 2014, Havnes and Mogstad 2015). Nevertheless, the only
policy which was actually introduced during our sample period is a child care
reform which was passed in 2002. Andresen and Havnes (2014) describe that
the reform which a¤ected mainly 1-2 year old, which lowered the cost of child-
care for parents through subsidies and cheaper fees and invested in pre-school
infrastructure. Of our sample children, those born in 2000-2002 may have
potentially been a¤ected by this policy as their children would be aged 1-2
during the post-reform period. To see if our results are driven by the policy,
we rstly repeated our analysis selecting only the cohorts not a¤ected by the
reform and nd our results are robust. Secondly we included the municipal-
ity level childcare coverage (measured as the number of childcare spaces as a
proportion of the number of pre-school children in the municipality) and its
interaction with the family peer e¤ect. We found no signicant interaction,
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suggesting that our results are not confounded by the policy.21
Finally we have estimated a Tobit model to allow working hours to have
probability mass at zero and the corresponding average partial e¤ect of family
peers are reported in Appendix B Table A4. These e¤ects are similar to our
main estimation results, although slightly less precisely estimated in some
regressions.
8 Conclusions
By estimating the causal family peer e¤ect on a mothers labour supply
decisions after childbirth, we show how the inuence of a mothers peers is a
relevant mechanism which can amplify the e¤ect of changes a¤ecting womens
labour supply. We nd that the long-run family peer e¤ect on mothers de-
cisions to work after the rst childbirth is large and statistically signicant.
An increase in the family peer hours worked by 1 hour raises the mothers
working hours by between 18 and 27 minutes. Such family peer e¤ects would
imply a social multiplier of 1.5, meaning that a policy change which causes a
direct e¤ect on mothers labour supply of one working hour would be amplied
by an additional 0.5 through the indirect e¤ect operating via the inuence of
family peers. In addition to the pure multiplier e¤ect, the family peer e¤ect
will amplify the e¤ect of other policies which a¤ect female labour supply and
we illustrate an example of how this would work with a back of the envelope
estimate showing that a reform raising the compulsory schooling age in Nor-
way from 16 to 17 has a social multiplier e¤ect which is 48% of the direct e¤ect
of the policy.
While a mothers working hours is inuenced signicantly by family peers
her labour participation decision is not signicantly a¤ected by the average
working hours of her family peers. In keeping with the literature on parental
investments into child human capital, we show that the inuence of family
peers on mothers hours worked is explained by concerns about time allocation
21Results are available on request. Note that childcare availability data exists up to 2004
only.
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between family and work from the second year after birth onwards; but as the
child ages, concerns about nancial investments also become important.
To compare our results with the e¤ect of neighbours on womens labour
supply found in previous empirical studies, we also use our strategy in reverse
to identify the e¤ect of neighbours living in the same post code with the same
level of education and having giving birth between 1 and 5 years earlier than
the mother in question. We nd some signicant e¤ects but smaller than
the family peer e¤ects. This indicates that interactions between neighbours
are less relevant than between family peers. This may be because mothers
are less inuenced by their neighbours, or because dening neighbourhood
peers by mothers living in the same neighbourhood with the same education
cannot guarantee that the mothers actually interact with other mothers in her
postcode.
Finally, our estimation strategy takes account of the reection problem and
endogeneity issues. Nevertheless, to reassure ourselves that our results are not
biased, we run a large set of robustness checks to assess (i) the size of the
potential bias caused by unobserved shocks for specic occupations and levels
of education (such as general equilibrium e¤ects or workplace peer e¤ects) or
unobserved shocks to a wider area than the neighbourhood; (ii) the validity
of our instruments using extra instrumental variables; and iii) implementing
some placebo test where real family peers are replaced with ctitious peers
with similar characteristics or with cousins who give birth in the future. These
robustness checks suggest that there is no substantial bias in our estimates.
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Figure 1: Mothers Labour Supply
Notes: Norwegian register data.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Peer Groups
Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Number of Maternal Cousins 3.074 2.698 0 32
Number of Paternal Cousins 3.149 2.727 0 32
Number of Sisters 0.614 0.748 0 7
Number of Neighbours 26.924 33.256 1 296
Individual Characteristics
Mother Worked After 1 Year 0.602 0.489 0 1
Hours Worked After
1 year 18.640 17.855 0 40
2 years 19.313 17.759 0 40
3 years 19.340 17.660 0 40
4 years 20.523 17.515 0 40
5 years 21.841 17.357 0 40
6 years 22.544 17.274 0 40
7 years 23.463 17.095 0 40
Mother Worked 1 yr before Birth 0.776 0.417 0 1
Mother's Education 13.251 2.280 9 21
Father's Earnings, K1,000 243.333 173.089 0 17520.5
Father's Work Status 0.977 0.150 0 1
Mother's Age at Birth 25.818 4.364 16 45
Father’s Age at Birth 29.322 5.266 17 62
Low Birth Weight Indicator 0.048 0.213 0 1
Very Low Birth Weight Indicator 0.006 0.078 0 1
Congenital Disorder at Birth 0.041 0.198 0 1
Severe Deformity at Birth 0.025 0.155 0 1
Twin Indicator 0.018 0.133 0 1
Child's Year of Birth 1999.594 1.703 1997 2002
Child's Month of Birth 6.450 3.414 1 12
Number of observations 45,985
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Table 2: Estimation Results of the Family Peer E¤ects. First Birth.
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS 0.540*** 0.542*** 0.540*** 0.534*** 0.527*** 0.537*** 0.529***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
2SLS 0.639*** 0.786*** 0.825*** 0.846*** 0.697*** 0.741*** 0.557***
(0.143) (0.131) (0.129) (0.145) (0.131) (0.162) (0.155)
F statistic 1st Stage 47.23 58.43 62.41 31.02 40.31 35.89 39.27
Hausman Test p-value 0.49 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.86
2SLS Individual IV 0.152 0.446*** 0.400** 0.383* 0.304* 0.344* 0.235
(0.196) (0.160) (0.180) (0.196) (0.167) (0.197) (0.201)
F statistic 1st Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman Test p-value 0.10 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.35 0.18
N 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS Ordinary Least Squares; 2SLS two-stage least squares; 2SLS Individual IV two-stage least
squares controls for the IV at individual level. Regressors include mothers and fathers years
of education and their squared values, dummies for working during pregnancy, fathers
earnings and work status in the year post childbirth, father and mother age and age squared
at birth, dummies for low birth weight, for very low birth weight, for congenital malformations
and severe deformity an indicator for multiple births, birth cohort year and month of birth
dummies, and family peer means of the same set of covariates. F-statistic is the F-test
for H0: instruments have zero coe¢cients.
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Table 3: E¤ect of the average earnings of family peers on mothers hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS Individual IV 0.950 2.252 2.089 3.567** 2.864** 2.339** 1.500
(1.885) (1.863) (1.441) (1.443) (1.144) (1.083) (1.141)
F statistic 1st Stage 229.50 168.10 195.30 178.80 190.50 156.70 177.10
Hausman Test p-value 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.43 0.16 0.05 0.01
N 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984 45,984
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Earnings are measured standardized to have mean zero and variance one.
2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least squares which controls for the individual IV.
The regressors are the same as in Table 3.
F-statistic is the F-test for H0: instruments have zero coe¢cients.
Table 4: Family Peer E¤ect on Mothers Labour Participation
Mothers’ Participation
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family peers hours -0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
F statistic 1st Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman Test p-value 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.03
N 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least squares which controls for the individual IV.
The regressors are the same as in Table 3.
F-statistic is the F-test for H0: instruments have zero coe¢cients.
39
Table 5: Neighbourhood peer e¤ects
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS Individual IV
Neighbours effect 0.032 0.058 0.167*** 0.177** 0.288*** 0.134 0.070
(0.023) (0.050) (0.055) (0.077) (0.079) (0.084) (0.104)
F statistic 1st Stage 711.60 1229.00 583.40 295.40 325.60 284.20 272.30
Hausman Test p-value 0.23 0.40 0.18 0.22 0.01 0.54 0.89
N 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526 45,526
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2SLS Individual IV is the two-stage least squares which controls for the individual IV. Regressors
are the same as in Table 3. F-statistic is the F-test for H0: instruments have zero coe¢cients.
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Table 6: Robustness and Placebo Checks
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel a) Estimation using multiple IVs
2SLS Individual IV 0.348** 0.549*** 0.418*** 0.403** 0.339** 0.309* 0.170
(0.139) (0.136) (0.156) (0.162) (0.156) (0.178) (0.159)
F statistic 1st Stage 9.387 11.790 11.910 7.341 9.558 7.711 9.223
Hansen Test p-value 0.515 0.459 0.522 0.365 0.735 0.318 0.672
Hausman test p-value 0.558 0.627 0.464 0.277 0.174 0.229 0.052
Panel b) Estimation controlling for interactions between occupations and education
2SLS Individual IV 0.165 0.387** 0.375** 0.232 0.202 0.164 0.134
(0.208) (0.164) (0.178) (0.213) (0.183) (0.225) (0.206)
F statistic 1st Stage 30.17 39.38 41.43 31.54 29.23 24.58 31.37
Hausman test p-value 0.12 0.35 0.39 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.07
N 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517
Panel c) Controlling for Municipality Level
2SLS Individual IV 0.014 0.371** 0.328* 0.311 0.258 0.291 0.165
(0.207) (0.167) (0.188) (0.207) (0.172) (0.206) (0.212)
F statistic 1st Stage 33.04 44.43 48.82 34.51 35.65 24.81 29.23
Hausman test p-value 0.04 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.16 0.26 0.12
N 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517 39,517
Panel d) Placebo 1: Random assignment of peers by education, age at birth, working status one year before birth
% of significant family
peer effect
3.8% 3.9% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0% 3.7% 3.9%
Panel e) Placebo 2: Random assignment of peers by year of the child birth
% of significant family
peer effect
4.7% 3.7% 4.4% 3.5% 4.8% 3.4% 3.2%
Panel f) Placebo 3: Effect considering family peers who will become mothers in the future
2SLS Individual IV 0.253** -3.002 -0.358* -0.054 -0.094 -0.022 -0.080
(0.117) (3.313) (0.202) (0.101) (0.095) (0.084) (0.109)
F statistic 1st Stage 70.38 0.95 21.56 41.18 81.56 81.15 74.81
Hausman test p-value 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833 51,833
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Peer
e¤ects are estimated using the two-stage least squares (2SLS Individual IV). The regressors are the
same as Table 3. F-statistic 1st stage is the F-test for H0: instruments have zero coe¢cients.
% of signicant family peer e¤ect is percentage of cases out of 1000 with estimated peer e¤ects
which are statistically signicant at 5% level. Panel c) and d) randomly assign ctitious family peers
with 1,000 replications.
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Appendix A: Estimation in presence of measurement
errors
In our application we consider the dependent variable yir the number of
weekly hours worked by a mother in each of the 7 years after childbirth. These
variables are subject to measurement error. This is because for all mothers
we observe their working hours in November of the considered year after their
childbirth. This implies that the number of hours worked  years after child-
birth by women who gave birth in January of the year t is observed in No-
vember of the year (t+), i.e. [12  + 10] months after childbirth, while for
women giving birth in December of the year t we observe their labour supply
only [12  − 1] months after childbirth. Henceforth we dene our outcome
variable as the mothers working hours  years and 6 months after childbirth,
where  = 1, ..., 7. This implies that the working hours for women who give
birth in June of the year t is correct, but the working hours for women who do
not give birth in June will be subject to measurement error and will be proba-
bly overestimated for women giving birth before June and underestimated for
women giving birth after June. This is especially true for the rst years after
childbirth where female labour supply is subject to more change than in later
years.
Furthermore, we do not observe the exact number of hours worked, but we
know whether the mother works 0, between 1 and 19, 20 and 29 or 30 or more
hours per week. By rounding the working hours to 0 for non-working mothers
and to 10, 24.5 and 40 for working mothers, we can use this "rounded" variable
and quantify and compare di¤erences between mothers in term of hours.
The measurement errors caused by the rounding and by the month of obser-
vation a¤ect not only the dependent variables yir, but also the corresponding
average of the peers (cousins and siblings),
_
yF,i. We do not have any reason
to believe that such measurement errors be correlated with any of observed
and unobserved variables in our model. For this reason, in the following we
assume that yir follows the model
yir = y
T
ir + dirη + eir, (3)
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where yTir is the true working hours, dir is a row vector of 12 dummy variables
indicating the month of birth of the child, η is the column vector of correspond-
ing coe¢cients and eir is a classical measurement error which is independently
and identically distributed across individuals, independent of the true value
yTir and independent of the explanatory variables and error term in our model
of interest. Under this modied classical measurement error model, the error
on yir does not cause any inconsistency as long as we control for the e¤ect of
month of birth.
Let us now consider the family peers average of the outcome variable
_
yF,i =
P
j∈PFi
yjr
nFi
= yT (i)r + d
(i)
r η + e
(i)
r , (4)
where yT (i)r =
P
j∈Pi
yTjr
nFi
, d
(i)
r =
P
j∈Pi
dir
nFi
and e(i)r =
P
j∈Pi
ejr
nFi
are the averages
across family peers excluding the mother i of the true working hours, of the
vector of dummy variables for the month of birth and of the measurement
error. e(i)r and eir are independent because eir is independently distributed
across mothers and e(i)r is computed excluding the mother i herself. Under
this modied classical measurement error model for
_
yF,i the consequence of
the measurement error is simply an attenuation bias for the ordinary least
square estimation of the main regression model (2) as long as we control for
month of birth dummies averaged across the family peers. Furthermore, this
attenuation bias tends to cancel when either the peer group size increases
to innity so that e(i)r will tend to zero, or when we use our instrumental
variable estimation because our instruments are either free of measurement
error or with a measurement error which is independent of the family average
measurement error e(i)r .
In conclusion, measurement errors for the hours worked do not cause any
inconsistency for our two-stage least squares estimation, but it can cause some
increase in the standard errors. We expect the measurement errors eir and e
(i)
r
to be more relevant in the rst years after childbirth when most of the mothers
have not yet reverted back to their standard hours of work.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table A1a: Full Second Stage Results of Table 2
Mother’s working hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Endogenous effect of family Peers
Average working hours of family
peers 0.152 0.446*** 0.400** 0.383* 0.304* 0.344* 0.235
(0.196) (0.160) (0.180) (0.196) (0.167) (0.197) (0.201)
Effect of individual covariates
Neighbourhood Mean Hours 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.041***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mother years of schooling 2.104*** 1.846*** 1.724*** 1.492*** 2.384*** 3.006*** 3.673***
(0.453) (0.403) (0.457) (0.424) (0.461) (0.529) (0.471)
Mother schooling squared -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.043** -0.028* -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.093***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Mother works year prior to birth 9.462*** 7.023*** 6.052*** 5.620*** 5.049*** 4.576*** 4.704***
(0.336) (0.284) (0.287) (0.286) (0.275) (0.255) (0.274)
Father Earnings 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father works year post childbirth 0.479 2.276*** 1.321*** 2.177*** 2.220*** 2.112*** 1.661***
(0.443) (0.469) (0.464) (0.473) (0.509) (0.536) (0.537)
Mother Age at Birth 2.857*** 2.550*** 2.141*** 2.104*** 2.090*** 1.630*** 1.399***
(0.228) (0.211) (0.231) (0.191) (0.204) (0.219) (0.217)
Mother Age at Birth Squared -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.021*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Father Age at Birth 0.727*** 0.483** 0.260* -0.038 -0.052 0.153 0.109
(0.154) (0.204) (0.135) (0.135) (0.154) (0.156) (0.127)
Father Age at Birth Squared -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.005** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low Birth Weight -0.247 -0.126 -0.153 0.459 0.334 0.055 0.150
(0.446) (0.463) (0.392) (0.404) (0.404) (0.417) (0.417)
Very Low Birth Weight -2.167* -0.570 0.165 -1.272 -0.527 -0.579 0.463
(1.152) (1.167) (1.101) (1.217) (1.116) (1.109) (1.185)
Congenital Problems 0.707 -0.993 0.507 0.248 -0.260 -0.140 -0.052
(0.835) (0.776) (0.703) (0.669) (0.639) (0.650) (0.679)
Severe Deformity -0.922 0.383 -0.647 -0.982 -0.410 0.020 -0.239
(0.972) (0.817) (0.733) (0.766) (0.788) (0.816) (0.871)
Multiple Births -4.306*** -3.241*** -0.389 0.314 0.339 0.313 0.503
(0.635) (0.608) (0.822) (0.693) (0.680) (0.671) (0.702)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation which controls for the individual IV.
Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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Table A1b: Full Second Stage Results of Table 2
Mother’s working hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family peers average Exogenous Peer Effect
Mother years of schooling -0.128 0.165 -0.214 -0.448 -0.084 -0.218 0.226
(0.430) (0.368) (0.389) (0.389) (0.364) (0.477) (0.412)
Mother schooling squared 0.005 -0.015 0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.015
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
Mother works year prior to birth -0.914 -2.437** -1.817 -1.764 -1.146 -1.361 -0.784
(1.849) (1.241) (1.147) (1.120) (0.853) (0.983) (0.933)
Father Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father works year post childbirth 0.194 -0.776 0.564 0.133 -0.445 -1.067 0.594
(0.679) (0.566) (0.502) (0.533) (0.617) (0.703) (0.690)
Mother Age at Birth -0.039 -0.732* -0.678* -0.647 -0.459 -0.201 -0.243
(0.426) (0.374) (0.411) (0.443) (0.349) (0.383) (0.355)
Mother Age at Birth Squared -0.000 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Father Age at Birth -0.211 -0.140 -0.053 0.180 0.276* 0.145 0.022
(0.161) (0.186) (0.148) (0.167) (0.148) (0.151) (0.154)
Father Age at Birth Squared 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.004* -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low Birth Weight -0.324 -0.270 0.221 -0.330 -0.668 -0.538 -0.489
(0.525) (0.466) (0.452) (0.482) (0.482) (0.622) (0.537)
Very Low Birth Weight 2.131* -0.093 -1.383 0.370 0.583 0.242 -1.894
(1.269) (1.522) (1.314) (1.417) (1.264) (1.489) (1.452)
Congenital Problems -1.765* 0.793 -1.011 0.401 0.459 -0.615 -1.506*
(0.932) (0.970) (0.783) (0.710) (0.743) (0.873) (0.826)
Severe Deformity 1.714* -0.145 0.577 -0.335 -0.051 0.691 2.102**
(0.982) (1.048) (1.007) (0.978) (0.987) (1.104) (1.009)
Multiple Births 0.341 1.554 0.190 -0.357 0.106 0.023 -0.131
(1.111) (1.020) (1.000) (0.805) (0.753) (0.739) (0.896)
Observations 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
F statistic 1st Stage 37.07 48.48 52.05 37.52 38.79 27.69 32.57
Hausman Test p-value 0.10 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.35 0.18
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation which controls for the individual IV.
Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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Table A2: Full First Stage Results of Table 2
Family peers average working hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Individual variable Effect of individual covariates
Neighbourhood hours 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Mother schooling 1.196*** 1.175*** 0.612** 0.272 1.433*** 1.180*** 1.186***
(0.356) (0.350) (0.308) (0.329) (0.344) (0.296) (0.332)
Mother schooling squared -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.019 -0.007 -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Mother work year prior to birth 0.619*** 0.645*** 0.716*** 0.594*** 0.666*** 0.385** 0.704***
(0.161) (0.164) (0.164) (0.162) (0.165) (0.168) (0.170)
Father earnings -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father work status -0.107 0.761** 0.511 0.223 0.171 -0.026 0.606
(0.412) (0.383) (0.484) (0.448) (0.430) (0.513) (0.461)
Mother age at birth 0.629*** 0.465*** 0.403*** 0.260 0.148 0.337** 0.295*
(0.153) (0.168) (0.155) (0.166) (0.163) (0.155) (0.167)
Mother age squared -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.006* -0.003 -0.006** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Father age at birth 0.178 0.277*** 0.101 0.135 0.190** 0.201* 0.008
(0.109) (0.103) (0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.111) (0.108)
Father age squared -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003* 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Low birth weight -0.130 0.728** 0.255 -0.148 -0.127 -0.107 -0.163
(0.312) (0.334) (0.364) (0.367) (0.347) (0.367) (0.375)
Very low birth weight -0.660 -0.628 -0.348 0.402 -0.250 -0.141 0.055
(1.055) (0.994) (0.818) (0.883) (0.829) (0.873) (0.963)
Congential problems 0.451 0.443 0.483 0.291 0.207 0.439 -0.687
(0.530) (0.716) (0.629) (0.511) (0.591) (0.635) (0.712)
Severe deformity -0.635 -0.320 -0.264 -0.348 -0.417 -1.169 0.714
(0.632) (0.831) (0.734) (0.614) (0.793) (0.841) (0.872)
Multiple births 0.157 -0.139 1.106** 0.517 1.212** 0.826 1.221**
(0.582) (0.479) (0.497) (0.520) (0.530) (0.503) (0.524)
Family peers average Exogenous peer effect
Mother schooling -0.307 0.116 -0.092 -0.194 -0.056 0.949** 0.916***
(0.514) (0.501) (0.425) (0.394) (0.377) (0.407) (0.344)
Mother schooling squared 0.026 0.013 0.019 0.032** 0.033** -0.001 0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Mother work year prior to birth 9.392*** 7.623*** 6.231*** 5.726*** 5.037*** 4.730*** 4.451***
(0.232) (0.221) (0.234) (0.226) (0.257) (0.234) (0.248)
Father earnings 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Father work status 0.209 0.996** 0.862** 0.847* 1.564*** 2.349*** 2.322***
(0.471) (0.436) (0.393) (0.469) (0.529) (0.603) (0.617)
Father age at birth 2.105*** 2.128*** 1.904*** 1.806*** 1.837*** 1.345*** 1.186***
(0.200) (0.213) (0.196) (0.196) (0.215) (0.206) (0.197)
Mother age at birth -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother age squared 0.224 0.159 0.109 -0.103 -0.212 -0.189 -0.101
(0.139) (0.161) (0.146) (0.128) (0.140) (0.161) (0.141)
Father age squared -0.005** -0.005* -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Low birth weight 0.199 -0.403 -0.849* -0.805* -0.686 -1.083** -0.787
(0.461) (0.468) (0.495) (0.485) (0.477) (0.525) (0.528)
Very low birth weight 0.120 0.876 1.879 2.714* 1.420 2.792** 1.201
(1.181) (1.419) (1.642) (1.494) (1.340) (1.395) (1.264)
Congential problems 0.574 -0.045 -0.412 -0.374 0.488 0.550 0.529
(0.713) (0.848) (0.816) (0.834) (0.784) (0.815) (0.854)
Severe deformity -0.039 -0.450 -0.232 0.179 -0.398 -0.192 -0.409
(0.896) (0.988) (0.978) (0.989) (0.983) (1.031) (0.996)
Multiple births -4.256*** -3.870*** -1.824** -0.323 -0.554 -0.333 -0.639
(0.733) (0.812) (0.787) (0.740) (0.779) (0.925) (0.841)
Instrumental Variables Effect of the neighbours of family peers characteristics
Hours 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.065***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are for the rst-stage of the 2SLS estimation which controls for the individual IV.
Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
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Table A3: Peer E¤ects Using Di¤erent Denitions of Peers Groups
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel a) Peer effect considering only female cousins
2SLS Individual IV 0.170 0.427** 0.409** 0.552*** 0.391** 0.259 0.189
(0.250) (0.203) (0.192) (0.207) (0.168) (0.228) (0.226)
F statistic 1st Stage 25.60 32.70 45.96 32.01 37.23 24.22 26.43
Hausman Test p-value 0.38 0.96 0.93 0.51 0.90 0.47 0.35
N 42,825 42,825 42,825 42,825 42,825 42,825 42,825
Panel b) Peer effect considering only sisters
2SLS Individual IV 1.130* 0.733* 0.710** 0.197 0.434 0.642** 0.404*
(0.586) (0.395) (0.353) (0.223) (0.307) (0.321) (0.220)
F statistic 1st Stage 6.03 15.26 13.37 23.38 7.80 8.50 16.35
Hausman Test p-value 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.52 0.27 0.05 0.16
N 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Panel c) Peer effect considering sisters-in-law and cousins-in-law
2SLS Individual IV 0.377* 0.606*** 0.491** 0.587*** 0.425** 0.424* 0.377*
(0.208) (0.227) (0.191) (0.199) (0.216) (0.242) (0.208)
F statistic 1st Stage 36.99 24.93 32.61 31.05 22.01 20.01 36.99
Hausman Test p-value 0.42 0.86 0.71 0.91 0.55 0.59 0.42
N 37,373 37,373 37,373 37,373 37,373 37,373 37,373
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation which controls for the individual IV.
Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
Table A4: Tobit Instrumental Variables Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mothers’ Working Hours
Years Post Childbirth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2SLS Individual IV -0.019 0.492** 0.482* 0.426 0.305 0.255 0.141
(0.213) (0.244) (0.268) (0.294) (0.234) (0.265) (0.264)
F statistic 1st Stage 37.09 52.56 55.57 35.01 37.87 25.56 34.92
N 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985 45,985
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are for the two-stage least squares estimation which controls for the individual IV.
Year and month of birth dummies and their averages across family peers are included.
Marginal e¤ects reported.
47
